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Abstract 1 
 2 
Purpose 3 
A number of strategies have aimed to assist countries in procuring antiretroviral therapy 4 
(ARV) at lower prices. In 2009, as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 5 
(GFATM) commenced a voluntary pooled procurement scheme however, the impact of the 6 
scheme on ARV prices remains uncertain. This study aims to estimate the effect of VPP on 7 
drug prices using Efavirenz as a case study. 8 
 9 
Methods 10 
This analysis uses WHO Global price report mechanism (GPRM) data from 2004 to 2013. 11 
Due to the highly skewed distribution of drug Prices, a generalized linear model (GLM) was 12 
used to conduct a difference-in-difference estimation of drug price changes over time. 13 
 14 
Results 15 
These analyses found that voluntary pooled procurement reduced both the ex-works price 16 
of generic Efavirenz and the incoterms price by 16.2% and 19.1%, respectively (P<0.001) in 17 
both cases). The year dummies were also statistically significant from 2006 to 2013 18 
(P<0.001), indicating a strong decreasing trend in the price of Efavirenz over that period.  19 
Conclusion 20 
Voluntary pooled procurement significantly reduced the price of 600mg generic Efavirenz 21 
between 2009 and 2013.  Voluntary pooled procurement therefore offers a potentially 22 
effective strategy for the reduction in HIV drug prices and the improvement of technical 23 
efficiency in HIV programming.  Further work is required to establish if these findings hold 24 
also for other drugs.  25 
 26 
Introduction 27 
 28 
Global health initiatives and international non-government organisations (NGOs) such as 29 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the President’s Emergency 30 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) have used a number 31 
of strategies to procure antiretroviral therapy (ARV) at lower prices. Common strategies 32 
include negotiation (Seoane-Vazquez & Rodriguez-Monguio 2007; Wilson et al. 2012) and a 33 
range of procurement mechanisms (Waning et al. 2009). 34 
 35 
Historically, the funding mechanism of GFATM was based on the country coordination 36 
mechanism (CCM), which was initiated after receiving a grant proposal from the government. 37 
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Within this system, medicine procurement was effectively left to each principal recipient (PR) 1 
(Waning et al. 2010; Waning et al. 2009; Tren et al. 2009),  and Ripin et al. (2014) refer to this 2 
as a ‘distributed country-led’ model. Under this arrangement, each country was free to select 3 
its own supply chain and procurement companies, and to set policies to manage tendering, 4 
purchasing and ordering (Ripin et al. 2014). GFATM would then disburse the funds for the 5 
procurement once the country’s proposal was approved. Finally, each principal recipient (PR) 6 
would procure the ARV drugs. Under CCM, the Ministry of Health or another implementing 7 
body may negotiate ‘directly’ with manufacturers or contract with logistics companies using 8 
GFATM funding (Tren et al. 2009). 9 
 10 
There are a number of price reduction strategies available for HIV drugs: pooled 11 
procurement, differential pricing and generic competition;   12 
a) Pooled procurement involves purchasing drugs in bulk for multiple buyers, to reduce 13 
the cost of the drugs and is based on the principles of economies  of scale (Waning et al. 14 
2009). Multiple buyers are grouped into a single group to obtain the benefits of pooled 15 
procurement. 16 
b) Price differentiation based on the income of consumers, can maximize profits for 17 
manufacturers. In this instance, price differentiation or differential pricing occurs when low 18 
and middle income countries are sold the drugs at lower prices than high income countries 19 
(Moon et al. 2011). 20 
c) Generic competition is a strategy where price is reduced by supplying multiple generic 21 
versions of drugs after the patent for the branded equivalent drug has expired. Perez-Casas 22 
(2000) showed that the price of a branded drug can be reduced by generic competition. In 23 
Brazil, generic competition lowered the branded price of Stavudine, Lamivudine and 24 
Nevirapine from $10,439 to $631, while the generic price dropped to $800 from $2,767. 25 
In 2009, GFATM commenced voluntary pooled procurement (VPP), wherein purchases 26 
were pooled at the national level, increasing the negotiating power of purchasers (Reich & 27 
Bery 2005). Under the VPP system, each PR country may volunteer to join the procurement 28 
programme, but are not obligated to do so. Between 2009 and 2011, 47 countries joined the 29 
scheme, usually to purchase one or more of five key health products: ARVs for HIV, 30 
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACTs) for malaria, long-lasting insecticidal bed nets 31 
(LLINs), rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for Tuberculosis (TB), and condoms. Overall, 307 million 32 
daily doses of antiretroviral drugs were procured and approximately 336,000 people received 33 
ARV therapy with drugs purchased through voluntary pooled procurement (GFATM 2012). 34 
 35 
The VPP mechanism is mainly implemented by a procurement services agent (PSA), 36 
working on behalf of a principal recipient country. 1  Although the GFATM may facilitate 37 
communications between the principal recipient and the procurement services agents (PSA), 38 
the GFATM does not act as an agent (GFATM 2011). The principle recipient sends a request 39 
with product specifications, quantities and delivery dates to the Procurement Services 40 
                                                          
1 The Global Fund hires local fund agents (LFA) such as Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) and KPMG 
who monitor and oversee grant performance. Their role is different from PSA (Tren et al. 2009; 
Donoghue et al. 2005). 
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Support (PSS) team. The PSA invites bids from manufacturers and submits price quotations to 1 
the principle recipient (GFATM 2011). The principle recipient then decides whether they 2 
accept the price quoted. The PSA can act for multiple principles in a single transaction, thus 3 
effectively ‘bulk buying’ for a number of purchasers. In theory, bulk purchasing of this sort is 4 
expected to lead to price reductions in commodities (Wafula et al. 2014; Waning et al. 2010).  5 
 6 
Pooling procurement would be expected to increase procurement efficiency and reduce 7 
transaction costs (Reich & Bery 2005), further reducing the cost of drugs purchased. Pooled 8 
procurement is a form of cooperation between buyers and suppliers using the purchasing 9 
power that buyers have (Huff-Rousselle 2012).  The purpose of pooled procurement is to 10 
provide sustainable supply of commodities, reduce transaction costs and the total price paid 11 
for ARV (World Health Organisation 2015). Therefore, appropriately conducted pooled 12 
procurement is likely to help low income countries access to ARV. 13 
 14 
However, there is a paucity of evidence regarding the effect of bulk purchasing and VPP 15 
on procurement prices in practise. Waning et al. (2009) tried to estimate the impact of global 16 
strategies such as large volume purchasing and the Clinton Health Access Initiative’s  (CHAI) 17 
price negotiation on antiretroviral drug prices, using the global price purchasing mechanism 18 
(GPRM) database. They carried out an analysis using bulk purchase as a proxy for pooled 19 
procurement. They concluded that large purchase volumes did not necessarily reduce drug 20 
prices.  While their study found no beneficial price effect in the case of a single buyer, a study 21 
of VPP would enable the exploration of a potential price effect when bulk purchasing is 22 
conducted on behalf of multiple buyers.Wafula et al. (2014) studied procurement prices after 23 
the introduction of VPP, using 115 completed questionnaires from 69 countries. In that study, 24 
two-thirds of those who had used the VPP system replied that VPP made procurement 25 
cheaper, although that reduction was not quantified as this study was based on the 26 
interviews. Wafula et al. (2013), in a separate study, also analysed regional and temporal 27 
trends in the costs of malaria-related commodities using procurement data from 79 countries. 28 
They concluded that VPP resulted in significant declines in the cost of malaria rapid diagnostic 29 
tests (RDTs) and long-lasting insecticide-treated nets (LLINs). The impact of VPP on 30 
antiretroviral drugs was, however, not explored. 31 
 32 
In addition to the studies already cited above, other studies have explored drug prices 33 
using procurement data.  Danzon et al.(2013) examined the effect of income and competition 34 
on drug prices using GPRM data and IMS health2 data for the period 2004–2008. GPRM data 35 
was used to compare procurement prices, while IMS data was used to compare retail prices. 36 
The authors found that the income of a country was not associated with the drug prices and 37 
the availability of generic competition did not reduce the price of drugs.  However, they also 38 
found that procurement based on tendering that stimulates price competition can reduce the 39 
prices of ARVs. Lucchini et al. (2003) studied ARV price variation in Africa and Brazil. They used 40 
an econometric analysis with multiple linear regressions for 13 sub Saharan African countries 41 
in their study of price variation, using data from Medecines Sans Frontiers (MSF). As with 42 
Danzon et al. (2013), they found no clear  relationship between basic indicators like GDP per 43 
capita and the ex-manufacturer prices for generic and original drugs across countries.  Wirtz 44 
et al. (2009) carried out a study of price comparison of ARV drugs in order to identify factors 45 
                                                          
2 IMS health is a private company offering information regarding health care. 
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related to lower drug prices. In contrast with Danzon et al. (2013)  and Lucchini et al. (2003),  1 
they concluded that countries defined as ‘lower-middle income’ and ‘upper-middle income’ 2 
tended to pay significantly more for ARVs than ‘low-income countries’. They did not focus on 3 
compulsory licensing but demonstrated that differential pricing is not applied in proportion 4 
to the income per capita of country. No study has yet, to our knowledge, formally explored 5 
the impact of VPP on antiretroviral drug prices. 6 
 7 
To fill this gap in the evidence, this study aims to estimate the effect of VPP on the price 8 
of antiretroviral drugs, using difference-in-difference (DID) analysis of WHO GPRM data. The 9 
drug Efavirenz is chosen as a case study given the emphasis on fixed dose combination (FDC) 10 
therapy in the WHO HIV treatment guidelines (World Health Organisation 2004). 11 
 12 
 A significant proportion of patients are currently on Efavirenz. In 2012, approximately 13 
16% of children were using Efavirenz based first-line regimens in low and middle income 14 
countries (World Health Organisation 2014). One study conducted in Sweden reported that 15 
among 276 HIV patients, 61% (168 patients) were given EFV as part of the initial regimen 16 
(Leutscher et al. 2013).  In 2008, the number of people using Efavirenz was less than 2 million 17 
but expected to rise to more than 9 million by 2016 (World Health Organisation 2014). Given 18 
the expectation that approximately 16.8 million people will be using anti-retroviral therapy 19 
by 2016 (World Health Organisation 2014), and Efavirenz is increasingly being used as part of 20 
ARV administration, demand for the drug is likely to remain high. 21 
    Antiretroviral therapy generally requires a large number of tablets every day. In 22 
contrast, fixed-dose combinations (FDCs) need only once or twice daily doses, significantly 23 
simplifying the process of antiretroviral therapy (World Health Organisation 2010). Fixed-dose 24 
combination therapy tends also to be cheaper than more complex treatment schedules 25 
(Calmy et al. 2006) and is more easily preserved, as it does not need refrigeration. As a result, 26 
FDC therapy is especially useful in resource-limited countries in which cold storage may be 27 
absent or unreliable. Perhaps unsurprisingly, global organisations are increasing their 28 
commitment to FDC (Bowen et al. 2008) and non-nucleoside reverse-transcriptase inhibitors 29 
(NNRTI) such as Efavirenz or Nevirapine, which have a pivotal role in FDC therapy. Of these 30 
drugs, Efavirenz is widely held to have a smaller risk of virologic failure (The HIV-CAUSAL 31 
Collaboration 2012). Considering that the wider uptake of FDC therapy may, in itself,  have 32 
lowered ARV prices in the procurement market (Waning et al. 2010), it becomes important to 33 
adopt a methodology that can isolate any additional price effects of voluntary pooled 34 
procurement. 35 
Data  36 
 37 
This analysis uses WHO Global Price Report Mechanism (GPRM) data from 2004 to 2013. 38 
This is a panel data set of information on transaction prices for antiretroviral drugs purchased 39 
by international donors and programmes in low- and middle-income countries.  GPRM is an 40 
umbrella term for procurement data. It was developed from an earlier version of the Price 41 
and Quality Report (PQR), and the price data included in the Price and Quality Report is 42 
automatically fed into the GPRM (Hinsch et al. 2014).   Procurement services agents (PSAs) 43 
are responsible for entering data into the price and quality report (PQR) system, and therefore 44 
also into the GPRM. Grant funded purchases conducted using voluntary pooled procurement, 45 
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are similarly reported to the PQR system by the procurement services agents (PSA) and so 1 
need not be entered by principal recipient (PR) countries (GFATM 2014). As the aim of this 2 
study is to estimate the overall impact of VPP on the mean change in a particular drug’s price 3 
in all locations, rather than any country-specific impact on prices, GPRM data appears to be 4 
appropriate for the purpose of this analysis. 5 
 6 
GPRM data contain two types of prices: ex-works prices and International Commercial 7 
Terms (incoterms) prices. Ex-works prices refer to the wholesale price at the manufacturer’s 8 
site, while incoterms prices reflect which side, either seller or buyer, covers payment and risks 9 
(Médecins Sans Frontières 2015). Incoterms prices are expected to reflect real procurement 10 
prices because the procurement process involves shipping charges such as freight and 11 
transport fees, which are not appropriately reflected in ex-works prices. Incoterms includes 12 
ex-works price and other 10 rules : FCA( Free Carrier) ; CPT(Carriage Paid To) ; CIP (Carriage 13 
And Insurance Paid To) ; DAT (Delivered At Terminal) ; DAP (Delivered At Place) ; DDP 14 
(Delivered Duty Paid) ; FAS (Free Alongside Ship)  ; FOB (Free On Board) ; CFR ( Cost and 15 
Freight) ; CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight)  ; EXW( Ex works) (International Chamber of 16 
Commerce 2010). 17 
 18 
The main Incoterms rules applied for VPP countries from 2009 to 2013 were: EXW (Ex 19 
works: 68%), CIP (Carriage And Insurance Paid To:14%), and FCA (Free Carrier: 13%). Those 20 
non VPP countries for the same period were; CIP (Carriage And Insurance Paid To: 27%), FCA 21 
(Free Carrier: 25%), and EXW (Ex works :15%). This text has also been inserted in the 22 
appendices (Appendix 6). 23 
Information as to whether a country procured ARVs through VPP was obtained from the 24 
Price and Quality Reporting System (PQR) data (Appendix 1). A total of 25 out of 107 countries 25 
volunteered for VPP to procure generic Efavirenz between 2009 and 2011 (Appendix 1). 26 
GPRM data specify country, dosage, incoterms and ex-works unit prices, number of units, and 27 
manufacturer. Under VPP, Efavirenz was procured by only one logistics company, the 28 
Partnership for Supply Chain Management (PFSCM) (Appendix 2). This study focuses on 29 
600mg Efavirenz, given that the 600mg dosage makes up more than 60% of all procured 30 
Efavirenz (appendix 3).  A total of 25 out of 107 countries volunteered for VPP to procure 31 
generic Efavirenz between 2009 and 2011 (Appendix 1), however, countries may procure 32 
Efavirenz through VPP or other programmes.  To include only Efavirenz procured by VPP, 33 
observed data was dropped if the manufacturers in the GPRM data and price quality reporting 34 
(PQR) data did not match. 121 observations over 10 years were retained for a treatment 35 
group of 25 countries, while 482 were from a control group of 82 countries. 36 
 37 
 38 
 39 
Methods 40 
 41 
Difference in difference estimation of the impact of voluntary pooled procurement on 42 
drug prices in this study can be expressed using Equation (1) (Greene 2012; Cameron & Trivedi 43 
2005). 44 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑉𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽4𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝐻𝐼𝑉 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑁𝐼 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑃𝐼 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
+ 𝛽9𝑇𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
 1 
where,   𝑉𝑃𝑃 is a dummy variable equalling 1 for those countries that utilised VPP and 0 2 
for those not using VPP. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 is a set of year dummy variables representing years with the 3 
label/name corresponding to the relevant year,  spanning 2004 to 2013 and generated from 4 
a reference year of 2004. Since VPP was implemented in different countries for different 5 
periods from 2009, the interaction term of VPP (Treatment)  Year (Post) is the main variable 6 
of interest, and the coefficient of this term is the effect of VPP on procurement prices (Greene 7 
2012). Subscripts t and i refer to year and country, respectively, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.   8 
 9 
Due to the highly skewed distribution of drug prices, a generalised linear model (GLM) 10 
was employed in the estimations. GLM is an estimation strategy well suited to modelling  11 
skewed data (Glick et al. 2014).  Several other models have been suggested for skewed data 12 
including  ordinary least square (OLS) on log transformed data, and a GLM with a log link and 13 
Gamma or Poisson distributions. The first approach using log transformation has the 14 
challenge of necessitating a smearing factor. Exponentiation of the mean of the logs 15 
generates the geometric mean of the skewed dependent variable (in this case costs), which 16 
is a downward-biased estimate of the arithmetic mean (Glick et al. 2014). To avoid this 17 
problem, a smearing factor, ∅ = 1/𝑁 ∑ 𝑒(𝑧𝑖−?̂?𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1 should be used where 𝑧𝑖 corresponds to 18 
the log of cost and ?̂?𝑖 corresponds to the treatment-group-specific mean of the log. However, 19 
results using this smearing factor can be inconsistent. In contrast, GLM predicts the mean of 20 
the log without using a smearing factor and thus tends to yield more consistent results. 21 
 22 
GLM does however, entail assumptions about the underlying distribution (Cameron & 23 
Trivedi 2005; McCullagh & Nelder 1989). The modified park test for the data suggests the 24 
choice of the Gamma distribution for the GLM, presenting the coefficient of 2.037 (P-value= 25 
0.7374).  When the coefficient is approximately 2, Gamma distribution is recommended 26 
whereas Poisson is chosen when the coefficient is 1. In addition, high p-value presents that 27 
Gamma distribution cannot be rejected. As a result, a GLM with a log link and Gamma 28 
distribution was chosen for this study. All analyses were carried out with Stata, Version 12 29 
(StataCorp, College Station, Texas, USA). 30 
  31 
To capture country-level heterogeneity, a fixed-effects model was used in the analysis. 32 
In practice, it is hard to assume that it was only VPP that affected the procurement prices. 33 
The fixed-effects model is a good method to control the endogeneity owing to a time-34 
invariant omitted variable (Cameron & Trivedi 2005).  In other words, the fixed-effects model 35 
is robust to unobserved time-invariant omitted variables. As commands in STATA (version 12) 36 
for GLM do not fully support fixed effects, country dummies were included as subject-specific 37 
intercepts for fixed effects. We implemented the Hausman test with the null hypothesis that 38 
the preferred model is random effects (RE) vs. the fixed effects (FE): Chi2(16)=61.75 (P 39 
value<0.001). Therefore, the more appropriate model for the data in the study is confirmed 40 
as a FE model. 41 
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Considering the literatures for factors associated with prices for HIV drugs (Wirtz 2009; 1 
Chirac 2002; Moon et al. 2011; Waning et al. 2009; Lucchini et al. 2003; Danzon et al. 2013; 2 
Schustereder & Juetting 2008; Pérez-Casas 2000; Danzon & Chao 2000; Barton 2001; 3 
Giaccotto et al. 2005; Gray & Matsebula 2004; Baltagi & Moscone 2010; Olcay & Laing 2005; 4 
Bac & Yannick 2002) and the panel data of a drug price that will be used in this study, seven 5 
independent variables at country level were included in the model (Table 1): transaction 6 
volume of 600mg Efavirenz, HIV prevalence, tax revenue as percentage of GDP, gross national 7 
income (GNI), consumer price index (CPI), public health expenditure as % of total health 8 
expenditure, and number of generic manufacturers. Transaction volume is the sum of the 9 
product of quantity per package and the number of packages, and it is obtained from WHO 10 
GPRM. The number of generic manufacturers presents a generic competition in the market, 11 
which is in line with the study by Danzon et al.(2013). Among the studies identifying the 12 
importance of these independent variables in analyses of drug prices, only four carried out 13 
their analyses using procurement data (Lucchini et al. 2003; Danzon et al. 2013; Wirtz 2009; 14 
Waning et al. 2009).  Consequently, the association between procurement and these likely 15 
independent variables will be investigated further in this study.  16 
 17 
Sample size 18 
 19 
This study uses a sample size of 25 treatment countries and 82 control countries.  There 20 
is no general guideline on the minimum treatment group size for country level difference in 21 
difference analysis.  Jones and Schneider (2010)  explored  the association between global 22 
inequality in income and national average IQ using 23 countries of treatment group and 63 23 
comparisons. Slaughter (2001) performed difference in difference analysis at country level 24 
with four countries belonging to the European Economic Community (EEC) as a treatment 25 
group and 54 countries in the control group, in order to see how trade liberalisation 26 
contributes to per capita income convergence across countries.  These examples demonstrate 27 
that country level difference in difference analysis is generally based on unbalanced data.  28 
Considering also the sample size norms established by these studies, the sample size 29 
proposed for this study is likely to be acceptable. 30 
 31 
Nevertheless, to compensate for the relatively small number of observations for VPP 32 
attending countries and further bolster the results of this analysis, a simulation using wild 33 
cluster bootstrap was conducted. This simulation technique, based on re-sampling, is widely 34 
used in DID analysis to check the robustness of the result (Conley & Taber 2011; Bertrand et 35 
al. 2012). It has been shown that wild cluster bootstrap can work well in providing 36 
conservative p-values even for 3 treated groups and 27 control groups (Imbens & Kolesar 37 
2012).  A further advantage of using the wild cluster bootstrap, is to reduce the risk of over-38 
rejection by adjusting the size of standard error (Cameron & Miller 2015). The key idea of 39 
using the wild cluster bootstrap is to rely on the fact that model errors of a given cluster are 40 
correlated over time, preserving the observed correlation in errors by drawing errors on the 41 
basis of original errors (Cameron & Miller 2015). 42 
 43 
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Results  1 
 2 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for this study. Means of incoterms prices and 3 
ex-works prices are substantially and significantly different between the treatment group and 4 
the control group (p-value <0.001). Among the covariates, GNI (p-value=0.0033) and CPI (p-5 
value<0.001) were statistically different between the treatment group and the control group. 6 
These results show the possibility that VPP has an impact on the reduction of drug prices and 7 
that GNI and CPI will be significantly different between VPP attending countries and others.  8 
In Table 1, the mean incoterms price for pre-intervention and post intervention for VPP 9 
and non VPP countries are 0.56 and 0.65, respectively. These fall to 0.15 and 0.2 after 10 
intervention. Therefore, there is a 73% reduction in the price for VPP countries and a 69% 11 
reduction for non-VPP countries. Likewise, for ex-works prices, VPP have a mean of 0.52 and 12 
0.14 pre- and post- intervention respectively, amounting to a 73% price reduction.  In non-13 
VPP countries, ex-works prices are 0.6 and 0.18 pre- and post- intervention respectively, 14 
amounting to a 70% price reduction. In both cases the price reduction is higher for VPP 15 
countries. 16 
 17 
[Table 1 here] 18 
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 1 
Distribution of drug prices 2 
 3 
The histogram of ex-works price and incoterms price presents the skewed distribution of 4 
drug prices (Figure 1). This histogram shows that using GLM would be appropriate for this 5 
study. 6 
[Figure 1 here] 7 
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The assumption of a common trend  1 
 2 
A critical assumption of using a DID estimator is to check whether common time trends 3 
hold (Cameron & Trivedi 2005; Blundell & Dias 2009; Angrist & Pischke 2009). The availability 4 
of the DID estimator relies on the assumption that the underlying ‘trends’ in the outcome 5 
variable are similar for both treated and untreated groups in a pre-treatment period. In other 6 
words, the dependent variable should present a common trend before treatment in both the 7 
treatment and control groups. Although visually checking the trend with a graph is still 8 
recommended (Angrist & Pischke 2009),  Autor (2003) developed an econometric method to 9 
check a common trend assumption using lagged and lead variables.  10 
From figure 2, it appears that the common trend assumption holds for both incoterms 11 
prices and ex-works prices. In addition, this graph shows that there was no external shock, or 12 
so-called ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’, before treatment (Ashenfelter 1978). This assumption was again 13 
checked with the Autor (2003)’s method. This method establishes whether the treatment 14 
effect exists before and after the treatment using lag and lead variables. If lead and lag 15 
variables are significant, it implies that the effect of treatment existed before and after the 16 
treatment. If that is the case, the common trend assumption will not hold. 17 
 18 
 19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
 28 
 29 
 30 
 31 
 32 
 33 
 34 
 35 
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 1 
[Figure 2 here] 2 
[Table 2 here] 3 
Table 2 shows the result of testing for the assumption of a common trend based on 4 
Autor’s method. Other things being constant, GLM regression including lag and lead variables 5 
was carried out. Country effects estimated from this regression using leads and lags for the 6 
common trend can be seen in Appendix 4. Lag 1 and lag 2 are the coefficients of the lagged 7 
variable of interaction term ‘Treatment X Post’, while lead1 and lead2 are the coefficients of 8 
the lead variable of interaction term ‘Treatment X Post’.  The p-value of the lead variables in 9 
the table 2 is statistically insignificant, showing that the effect of VPP before treatment is close 10 
to zero. If the trends between treatment and control group are sufficiently similar, then lead2 11 
and lead1 will be insignificant. In other words, DID is not significantly different between 12 
treatment and control group in the pre-treatment period. Synthetic control method, which 13 
synthesises hypothetical counterfactuals with the weighted average of other control groups, 14 
was not used because the common trend holds (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003).  In sum, this 15 
result implies that the effect was not happening in the pre-post period, and so it can be 16 
concluded that the common trend assumption holds.  17 
12 
 
Difference-in-difference analysis 1 
 2 
[Table 3 here] 3 
 4 
Table 3 presents the result of difference-in-difference analysis on VPP. The regression 5 
result of GLM shows that the ‘Treatment X Post’ term was statistically significant at the 0.1% 6 
level for each price. Country dummies were used for fixed effects as aforementioned in the 7 
method section and the result is included in appendix 5 due to the large volume. The results 8 
of both ex-works prices and incoterms prices in GLM were -0.177 (95% confidence interval: -9 
0.247 to -0.107; p-value<0.001) and -0.213 (95% confidence interval : -0.287 to -0.139; p-10 
value<0.001), respectively. This suggests that VPP has an effect of reducing the ex-works 11 
prices of generic Efavirenz by 16.2% and incoterms prices by 19.1%, respectively, after taking the 12 
exponential of the interaction term.. It is also noted that year dummies were also statistically 13 
significant from 2006 to 2013. On the other hand, it can be seen that the magnitude of year 14 
dummies is gradually increasing. In 2006, ex-works prices decreased by approximately 29.3%  15 
and incoterms prices by 31.8%after taking the exponential of the year 2006 dummy . However, in 16 
2013, the results of GLM regression show that ex-works prices decreased by approximately 17 
88.0% and incoterms prices by 88.3%, compared with when the year is not 2013, after taking the 18 
exponential of the year 2013 dummy. Other independent variables were statistically insignificant 19 
in GLM.  20 
 21 
[Table 4 here] 22 
 23 
Table 4 presents the result of bootstrap simulation on the impact of VPP with the 24 
standard DID model described in equation 1. An identical interaction term of Treatment X 25 
Post in table 3 was used. On the basis of 1,000 times bootstrap re-sampling, this result shows 26 
that the coefficient of interaction term of ‘Treatment X Post’ was consistently negative, -0.174 27 
(95% confidence interval: -0.272 to -0.063, p-value<0.001) for ex-works price and -0.217 (95% 28 
confidence interval: -0.320 to -0.117, p-value<0.001) for incoterms price, respectively. Based 29 
on this result, VPP reduced the mean unit cost of Efavirenz by 16% for ex-works price and by 30 
19% for incoterms price. Bias was as small as 0.0048 for ex-works price and 0.0055 for 31 
incoterms price, presenting no substantial difference from the result of GLM model in table 32 
3. Wild cluster bootstrap was conducted separately with the identical model in equation 1, 33 
and the result is incorporated in table 4. The P-values based on the wild cluster bootstrap for 34 
both ex-works price and incoterms price in table 4 are increased compared with p-values 35 
estimated using cluster robust standard error in table 3 (ex-works price: p<0.001; incoterms 36 
price: p<0.001). However, the p-values were 0.028 and 0.01, which are still statistically 37 
significant at 5% level. In brief, this result of simulation supports the result of the difference-38 
in-difference analysis and the impact of VPP. 39 
 40 
 41 
 42 
13 
 
 Discussion 1 
This study examined the effect of VPP on the procurement prices of ARV. Efavirenz was 2 
chosen as a case study given the frequent use of Efavirenz in fixed dose combination (FDC) 3 
therapy for HIV. A difference-in-difference (DID) estimator in regression form was used to 4 
estimate the effect of VPP. The assumption of a common trend was confirmed with graphs 5 
and a regression model using lags and leads of the interaction term. To the best of our 6 
knowledge, this is the first study estimating the impact of VPP on ARV procurement prices 7 
adopting a formal econometric method.  8 
 9 
The analyses found VPP significantly reduced the procurement price of 600mg generic 10 
Efavirenz. The coefficient of the DID estimator was significant at the 0.1% level for both ex-11 
works prices and incoterms prices. Simulation using 1,000 times bootstrap re-sampling and p-12 
values calculated by a wild cluster bootstrap strongly supported the results of the DID analysis.  13 
 14 
A strong decreasing trend in the ARV price over 8 years was also found. Year dummies 15 
were significant for all years aside from 2005. The finding of decreasing ARV costs over 8 years 16 
is consistent with the results of Wafula et al.(2013) and with the trend of consistently 17 
decreasing ARV prices more widely observed. The median procurement price per treatment 18 
year for adult first-line regimens in low- and middle-income countries decreased from $US 19 
499 to $122 between 2003 and 2013 (Perriëns 2014; Perriëns et al. 2014). In 2006, UNITAID 20 
was launched to supply drugs at lower prices (Bermudez & Hoen 2010).  Also in 2006, Generic 21 
FDCs were available to PEPFAR recipients after FDA approval (Waning et al. 2010). Donor 22 
funding for HIV increased from $1.6 billion to $8.7 billion largely due to PEPFAR and GFATM 23 
from 2002 to 2008 (Kates et al. 2009). The GAVI alliance (GAVI) committed US $500 million 24 
for a 5-year period from 2006 to 2010 (Patel et al. 2015). Therefore, the decreasing trend in 25 
ARV prices may be associated with increased funding for ARV procurement, the emergence 26 
of powerful global donors, and the introduction of generic drugs.  These analyses 27 
demonstrate that the use of VPP can further reduce drug prices. 28 
  29 
In addition, it was found that HIV prevalence was not associated with drug prices. This is 30 
consistent with Danzon et al. (2013) and Wirtz et al. (2009). Transaction volume was not 31 
associated with the drug price. This too is consistent with results from Wirtz et al. (2009). 32 
They found that transaction volume does not have an effect on the price reduction using 33 
GPRM data. This fact confirms that GPRM data do not support our common assumption that 34 
large procurement volume reduces procurement prices.Generic competition was not 35 
statistically significant and again, this is consistent with results from Danzon et al. (2013) and 36 
is plausible because there is little incentive to reduce ARV prices in generic markets. 37 
 38 
While VPP may improve access to HIV drugs, it is difficult to say whether or not improved 39 
procurement arrangements have the ability to strengthen the health systems of low and 40 
middle income countries more generally. It has been pointed out that the long term 41 
dependence of principal recipients (PR) countries on external funding bodies can weaken the 42 
health systems of these countries (The World Bank(WB) and GAVI Alliance 2010). On the 43 
contrary, PR countries could turn this challenge into an opportunity if they use the 44 
experience to develop the capacity to forecast, budget and plan independently.  45 
14 
 
 1 
Mills (2014) argued that the strengthening of public systems of supply such as transport 2 
infrastructure could be an alternate solution for improving drug supply. In particular, a 3 
landlocked country may need additional time for transportation from the nearest port 4 
(GFATM 2011). This argument suggests that improving drug procurement processes may be 5 
an important starting point but would not be sufficient to improve drug access without a 6 
concurrent  expansion of public facilities and qualified health to ensure those drugs reach the 7 
patients most in need (Mills 2014).  Thus while VPP may not strengthen health systems more 8 
broadly, health systems strengthening seems a necessary precursor to maximising the gains 9 
of a VPP scheme. 10 
The quality of the data used in the study has been continuously improved through the 11 
use of rigorous data management and updating with new information. This includes; 12 
Individual transactions in GPRM showing a price of US$0 and duplications being removed 13 
(World Health Organisation 2013), missing data being replaced with updated price data 14 
compared to the previous version of the dataset a few years ago, the recent inclusion of 15 
Incoterms prices in the dataset (World Health Organisation 2013), and the fact that GFATM 16 
periodically report the transaction prices so that the data is constantly updated. Moreover, 17 
as procurement services agents (PSA) rather than recipient countries have the responsibility 18 
for data entry (GFATM 2014) , data is transparently managed.  However, these data do not 19 
have components of retail prices such as mark-up. Therefore, analysis of retail drug prices 20 
would not be possible with this dataset. 21 
The strengths of this study are, firstly, that it used the International Chamber of 22 
Commerce standard trade definition (Incoterms) price as a dependent variable. The majority 23 
of studies on procurement prices could not consider the incoterms prices due to data 24 
unavailability. However, excluding incoterms can strongly bias the results regarding 25 
procurement prices because procurement processes include the variable cost of freight and 26 
shipping. This study attempted to reduce this bias by employing incoterms price as the 27 
dependent variable. Secondly, this study is based on the recently updated GPRM data. The 28 
update made this data richer compared with the previous version of GPRM data; hence, the 29 
analysis carried out in this study did not have to rely on multiple imputation (MI) to 30 
supplement missing data. Thirdly, adopting fixed effects to GLM by including country 31 
dummies, which work as subject-specific slopes, this study tried to control endogeneity 32 
arising from time-invariant unobservables such as national policies. Instrumental variables 33 
were not used in this study as it was hard to find an appropriate instrument for the 34 
procurement price of ARVs, especially the price of incoterms, given the scarcity of literature 35 
on the procurement prices of ARVs. However, this study attempted to reduce the 36 
endogeneity caused by omitted variables (Cameron & Trivedi 2005) by including a proxy 37 
variable of generic competition such as the number of manufacturers and by using a fixed-38 
effects model. 39 
 40 
 41 
A few limitations of these analyses should be noted. Firstly, this analysis targeted only 42 
one ARV, Efavirenz. Therefore, the given result needs to be carefully interpreted and may not 43 
be generalizable to other types of drugs. Further research expanding the result of this study 44 
to other ARVs will be needed. Secondly, the timeline of analysis was limited to 2013 due to 45 
data unavailability, even though VPP is still being implemented.  46 
 47 
15 
 
Conclusion 1 
 2 
 3 
This study provides robust economic evidence about the effect of voluntary pooled 4 
procurement on antiretroviral drug prices and highlights a clear agenda for further work in 5 
this area.  Voluntary pooled procurement significantly reduced the price of 600mg generic 6 
Efavirenz between 2009 and 2013.  Voluntary pooled procurement can be a potentially 7 
effective strategy for the reduction in HIV drug prices and the improvement of technical 8 
efficiency in HIV drug procurement. Future work should aim to explore a more generalizable 9 
or multi-context analysis of the impact of voluntary pooled procurement.  It would also be 10 
possible and potentially worthwhile, to carry out a difference-in-difference analysis on a 11 
basket of various HIV drugs rather than focusing on a single drug such as Efavirenz as in this 12 
study.  13 
 14 
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